



A Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine

A collection of existing proposals and possible steps to end the war in Ukraine through
diplomacy rather than the use of weapons

The war in Ukraine is causing suffering, death, and devastation. With every day that the war lasts, more people are killed, physically injured, or psychologically traumatised.¹ Every day, the risk of the war spreading to other states or escalating to nuclear war. The missile incident in Poland makes this clear. And every day the worldwide famine intensifies, which has already affected about one tenth of the world's population even before the Ukraine war began². Every day of war is one too many – the war must now be ended as quickly as possible.

A new phase in the war on Ukraine has begun: through the Russian annexation of four Ukrainian regions, the decree by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy forbidding negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin³, the missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and the targeted destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the ever-increasing threats of nuclear escalation. All this increases the danger of escalation on the one hand, and further limits the possibilities for negotiation on the other. We are aware of this dilemma while – given the continued risk of nuclear war – we see the search for possibilities to reach a ceasefire, and to disseminate this information to the public, as our task.

A way out of the military spiral of escalation is needed. To achieve this, a ceasefire and peace negotiations are indispensable.

Russia's attack on Ukraine is illegal under international law. The Russian government is to blame for the war. At the same time, it requires joint action to end the war and create peace. As the South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor put it: "The world has a responsibility to make peace".⁴ Yet despite the immeasurable suffering caused by the war, there are currently no direct negotiations between the Russian and Ukrainian governments. The medical peace organisation IPPNW sees the danger of an escalation to nuclear war, as well as to a war of attrition lasting for years with catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the people in Ukraine and worldwide. It calls for strengthened international efforts for immediate negotiations and a diplomatic solution.

¹ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented the deaths of more than 6,374 civilians in Ukraine since the invasion of Russian troops on 24 February 2022, with more than 9,600 injured. According to Ukrainian government figures, around 67,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Russian sources say 61,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. These figures cannot be independently verified. According to estimates by the UN Refugee Agency, around 14 million people had fled Ukraine by mid-August.

² <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/un-un-warnen-vor-hungerwelle-hohe-kosten-durch-ukraine-krieg-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-220608-99-595122>

³ <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/verhandlungen-diplomatie-ukraine-krieg-russland-100.html>
Originaltext unter <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6792022-44249>

⁴ <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/heute-journal-update/g7-suedafrika-verlangt-diplomatische-loesung-100.html>

The following is a collection of proposals and possibilities for a ceasefire as well as ways to resolve the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and NATO. This takes into account that the countries of NATO bear a share of the responsibility for increasing tensions between Russia and NATO since the 1990s due to enlargement to the East. The report also considers that responsibility for the increased number of victims and danger of nuclear escalation does not belong to one party alone. This collection of ideas contains various concepts on bilateral, multilateral, scientific and civil society levels. The paper is intended to contribute to a consistent search for peaceful means of conflict transformation.⁵ It will be updated and supplemented on an ongoing basis.

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I Overview of agreements, negotiations, and new negotiation initiatives

Minsk II Agreement and "Normandy Format"

In 2014, Germany and France launched the so-called "Normandy format" to resolve the war in eastern Ukraine. The mediation rounds, each consisting of one representative from Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France, led to the signing of Minsk II in 2015.

The agreement was negotiated with the participation and mediation of the OSCE after the Minsk I ceasefire agreement failed. Following a unanimous resolution of the UN Security Council, Minsk II entered into force under international law in February 2015.⁶ This agreement was negotiated by Russia (Vladimir Putin), Ukraine (Petro Poroshenko), France (Francoise Hollande) and Germany (Angela Merkel).

In the agreement, numerous measures were agreed to bring peace to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, such as:

- ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides under OSCE supervision;
- release and exchange of prisoners, pardons, and amnesty;
- immediate launch of a dialogue on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions" as well as on the future regime of these areas;
- resumption of socioeconomic ties between eastern Ukraine and Kiev, including the banking system, transfers of payments e.g. social benefits such as pension payments;
- control of the state border by the Ukrainian government;
- withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE monitoring. Disarmament of all illegal groups;

⁵ <https://www.zeit.de/2022/27/ukraine-krieg-frieden-waffenstillstand> June 29, 2022

⁶ The text of the Minsk Agreement of 12 February 2015: <https://www.bpb.de/themen/europa/ukraine/201881/dokumentation-das-minsker-abkommen-vom-12-february-2015>

- constitutional reform, including reference to the specificities of certain areas in the the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the decentralisation of Ukraine.

However, the agreement was never implemented. Both sides repeatedly broke the ceasefire.

Between the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, attempts were made again to reach an agreement, mediated by France, to comply with the Minsk Agreement. Both Russian President Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Zelensky declared their willingness to begin implementation.⁷

In February 2022, a final round of talks in this format failed because Russia did not agree to issuing a joint declaration. The reason they gave for this was that the Ukrainian side had refused to quote the Minsk agreement, according to which the future status of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was to be clarified in consultations with the representatives of the districts after the war.

With the recognition of the "people's republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk on 21 February 2022, Russian President Putin created a new situation, finally breaking with the agreements of Minsk II. Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine put an end to the peace process.

Istanbul Ten-Point Plan

During the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, the Ukrainian delegation presented a new written proposal for an agreement on security guarantees. According to media reports, the negotiations came "close to an (...) agreement on security guarantees".⁸

The ten points of the Ukrainian proposal can be summarised as follows:

Point 1: Ukraine proclaims itself a neutral state, promising to remain nonaligned with any blocs and refrain from developing nuclear weapons — in exchange for international legal guarantees. Possible guarantor states include Russia, Great Britain, China, the United States, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, and Israel.

Point 2: These international security guarantees for Ukraine would not extend to Crimea, Sevastopol, or certain areas of the Donbas. The parties to the agreement would need to define the boundaries of these regions or agree that each party understands these boundaries differently.

Point 3: Ukraine vows not to join any military coalitions or host any foreign military bases or troop contingents. Any international military exercises would be possible only with the consent of the guarantor-states. For their part, these guarantors confirm their intention to promote Ukraine's membership in the European Union.

Points 4-6: This outlines how the guarantor states are to proceed in the event of an armed attack against Ukraine, similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty on a collective defence obligation.

Point 7: The treaty enters force after Ukraine's permanently neutral status is approved in a nationwide referendum, and the introduction of the appropriate amendments in Ukraine's Constitution.

⁷ <https://www.lpb-bw.de/ukrainekonflikt#c68666>

⁸ <https://www.rnd.de/politik/ukraine-verhandlung-russland-zieht-erste-forderungen-zurueck-durchbruch-EVANOK5LRFD33C3XJVH2KRJBMA.html>

Point 8: The parties' desire to resolve issues related to Crimea and Sevastopol shall be committed to bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for a period of 15 years. Ukraine and Russia also pledge not to resolve these issues by military means and to continue diplomatic resolution efforts.

Point 9: The parties shall continue consultations to agree on the provisions of a Treaty on Security Guarantees for Ukraine, ceasefire modalities, the withdrawal of troops and other paramilitary formations, and the opening and ensuring of safe-functioning humanitarian corridors on an ongoing basis, as well as the exchange of dead bodies and the release of prisoners of war and interned civilians.

Point 10: hold a meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia for the purpose of signing a treaty and/or adopting political decisions regarding other remaining unresolved issues.⁹

During the further course of the war, Ukraine's military successes, Western state's promises of extensive arms deliveries and the expectation that Ukraine could win, as well as the disclosure of war crimes, contributed to this negotiation process coming to a standstill. According to Western and Ukrainian media reports, the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson's visit to Kiev to meet with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy April 9th, 2022, was also instrumental in the termination of negotiations with Russia. The British Guardian newspaper wrote on April 28th, 2022, that Boris Johnson had demanded that the Ukrainian president "make no concessions to Putin"¹⁰.

⁹ <https://meduza.io/en/slides/ukraine-s-10-point-plan>

¹⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/apr/28/liz-truss-ukraine-war-russia-conservative-power>

“Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process – a way of solving problems.” (John F. Kennedy, 1963)

The Italian peace plan

In May 2022, the Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio presented a four-step peace plan to UN Secretary General António Guterres. The UN, the EU and the OSCE should be involved in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Under the supervision of an international mediation group, a four-step plan would be implemented, covering a ceasefire, Ukraine's neutrality, a resolution of territorial issues and a European and international security pact. At each stage, the parties' compliance with their obligations should be assessed so that the next step can be taken.

Step 1: a ceasefire, to be negotiated while fighting, accompanied by supervisory mechanisms and demilitarisation of the front line.

Step 2: Ukraine would be a neutral country, with its security guaranteed by a not-yet-identified group of countries. The contours of this part of the plan would be discussed at a peace conference.

Step 3: a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine to clarify the future of Crimea and Donbas. The agreement would deal with cultural and language rights and guarantee the free movement of people, goods, and capital. Crimea and Donbas would have almost complete autonomy, including in questions of defence, but would be part of Ukraine.

Step 4: a multilateral peace agreement between the European Union and Russia that would include international disarmament and arms control, security guarantees, conflict prevention and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied Ukrainian territories. Within the framework of these measures, the sanctions against Russia could be withdrawn step by step¹¹.

Vatican International Working Group

At the invitation of the Vatican, an international working group led by the US economist Sachs developed solutions for a "just and lasting peace in Ukraine" in June 2022.¹²

The final statement said: " The war in Ukraine is likely to evolve into a war of attrition and end to as either a *frozen conflict* or a *negotiated peace*, rather than as an outright victory of one side over the other. A negotiated peace would be a superior outcome than the sacrifices of a war of attrition and a frozen conflict for both the peoples and governments of Ukraine, Russia, the US and EU, and the rest of the world. "

According to the working group, the Istanbul ten-point plan could be used as a basis for a possible peace agreement. The four-stage Italian peace plan would also be suitable.

The working group proposes the following approach:

¹¹ <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-05-20/card/italy-circulates-4-point-peace-plan-h2o9EfwULf6P1mwDbjdn>

¹² <https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/llyk5p69dhcrm8epskjc7zh9d9n42>

- (1) Neutrality of Ukraine, i.e., relinquishing the national ambition to join NATO while recognizing Ukraine's freedom to enter into agreements with the European Union and others;
- (2) Security guarantees for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine provided by the P-5 members of the United Nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus the European Union and Turkey, which might include military transparency and restrictions of military stationing and large-scale exercises in border areas under international observation connected to the lifting of economic sanctions;
- (3) Russian *de facto* control of Crimea for a period of years, after which the parties would seek through diplomacy a permanent *de jure*¹³ settlement, which might include facilitated access for local communities to both Ukraine and Russia, liberal border crossing policies for persons and trade, stationing of Russia's Black Sea Fleet and financial compensations;
- (4) Autonomy of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions within Ukraine, which might include economic, political, and cultural aspects, to be further detailed within a short period of time;
- (5) Guaranteed commercial access of both Ukraine and Russia to the Black Sea Ports of both countries;
- (6) The phased removal of Western sanctions on Russia in conjunction with the withdrawal of the Russian military according to the agreement;
- (7) A Multilateral Fund for Reconstruction and Development of the war-torn regions of Ukraine – in which Russia also participates -- and immediate access for humanitarian relief;
- (8) A UN Security Council Resolution to provide international monitoring mechanisms to support the peace agreement.

Mexican proposal for a diplomatic commission

Marcelo Ebrard Casaubon, Foreign Minister of Mexico, proposed at the UN General Assembly in September 2022 that mediation efforts by UN Secretary-General António Guterres should be strengthened, and the paralysis of the UN Security Council be overcome by establishing a commission of high-ranking international persons, such as the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pope Francis, who would negotiate with the heads of government in Ukraine and the Russian Federation¹⁴. Several Latin-American countries support Mexico's proposal. As one of the top heads of state in the region, the Colombian President, Gustavo Petro, said on September 21, 2022, "I invite Europe to talk about peace"¹⁵.

¹³ "de jure": having a right or existence as stated by law.

¹⁴ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/77/mexico>,
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/mexico-wants-un-panel-including-secretary-general-guterres-pope-pm-modi-broker-peace-between-russia-ukraine/articleshow/94385630.cms>

¹⁵ <https://www.jungewelt.de/artikel/435316.ruf-nach-diplomatie.html>

African Union calls for a mediation mission

Several heads of government from the Global South pressed for negotiations at the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Macky Sall, President of Senegal and Chair of the African Union, called for a negotiated solution to the war in Ukraine to be found and to initiate a “mediation mission” to achieve this¹⁶.

Russian draft treaties on security guarantees

In December 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine in violation of international law, the Russian Foreign Ministry presented draft treaties for mutual security guarantees between Russia and NATO¹⁷ and between Russia and the USA.¹⁸ The draft treaties contain, among other things, the demand for a halt to NATO's eastward expansion. Both the US government and NATO rejected this demand. According to the US response, however, they were prepared to rule out the permanent deployment of combat troops and ground-launched missile systems in Ukraine – provided Moscow also made corresponding commitments.¹⁹ According to political scientists, the Russian draft treaties could have been negotiated. Russia's red line was Ukraine's accession to NATO.²⁰

II Overview of proposed diplomatic solutions

Here we collate decisions of the UN General Assembly on the Ukraine war, as well as selected voices from the German peace research community and civil society who argue for diplomacy and negotiation.

UN General Assembly Resolution, March 2, 2022

The UN General Assembly met on March 2nd, 2022, following the failed attempt to condemn Russia in the Security Council. UN resolution A/ES-11/L.1²¹ condemning Russia's war of aggression was approved by a large majority of 141 to 5 votes, with 35 abstentions. In the resolution the UNGA urged “the immediate peaceful resolution of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine through political dialogue, negotiations, mediation and other peaceful means;” (UN Res A/ES-11/L.1 op. 14). German peace researcher Hanne-Margret Birckenbach pointed out in her article²² in the magazine “Friedensforum” that coercive methods such as sanctions or arms deliveries are not considered to be peaceful means, according to the UN Charter. “Majority support for actions other than peaceful means, such as those practised by Western States in the form of sanctions and arming, does not exist,” says Birckenbach.

¹⁶ <https://gadebate.un.org/en/77/senegal>

¹⁷ https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en&ysclid=l6w6n0cvra872512133

¹⁸ https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/rso/1790818/

¹⁹ https://elpais.com/infografias/2022/02/respuesta_otan/respuesta_otan_eeuu.pdf

²⁰ <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Traegt-der-Westen-eine-Mitschuld-an-Russlands-Krieg-article23208433.html>

²¹ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/272/27/PDF/N2227227.pdf>

²² Verhandlungen zur Kriegsbeendigung, Artikel im Friedensforum 09/2022

UN General Assembly Resolution, October 12, 2022

The UNGA condemned the Russian annexation of four regions in Ukraine on October 12th, 2022, by a large majority. 143 of 193 member states voted for a resolution²³ declaring the annexation to be invalid. Five countries voted against the resolution, 35 abstained. The UN demanded the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally reverse its decisions related to the status of certain areas of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine. In operative paragraph 7 of the resolution, Member States and international organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international and regional organizations, are called upon “to support the de-escalation of the current situation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict through political dialogue, negotiation, mediation and other peaceful means, with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and in accordance with the principles of the Charter”²⁴.

Peace research

The deputy director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg, Wolfgang Zellner, emphasises the role of the United Nations in his calls for negotiations. In addition, he puts forward Turkey as a mediator, as Turkey has previously acted as host for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Although a NATO member, they have not applied sanctions and have kept their airspace open for Russian aircraft. Turkey was also involved in negotiations on a transport corridor for grain from Ukraine through the Black Sea. Following an extended period where Ukrainian ports were blockaded, Ukraine and Russia reached an agreement in July 2022, mediated by Turkey, that paved the way to release the much-needed grain and other agricultural goods from Ukrainian ports. The agreement allows Russia, despite sanctions, to export grain and fertiliser. Guterres described the agreement of July 22nd, 2022, as a “beacon of hope” and “collective achievement” of the newly established Joint Coordination Centre, set up in Istanbul²⁵.

Dr. Anne Holper and Prof. Dr. Lars Kirchhoff, who head up the Centre for Peace Mediation at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt, are critical of the treatment of arms deliveries and negotiation as either-or issues. This has led so far to a lack of the required public and parliamentary pressure for an “internationally agreed-upon, multilaterally supported mediation initiative” to be reached. It is, however, necessary to prepare for such a comprehensive negotiation package right now. If a military stalemate is reached, a window of opportunity could open up. When such a window of opportunity could open is hard to predict and then a mediation initiative needs to be rapidly deployed.

It is especially important for Russia and the US to talk to each other since both nuclear powers need to create “a corridor for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine”, said peace researcher Nicole Deitelhoff in October 2022²⁶. First of all, talks need to be initiated, even if there are no negotiations yet. In this context the idea of “freezing” the conflict has been considered by various experts. However, experience shows that frozen conflicts quickly escalate to become violent ones, that is why

²³ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/630/66/PDF/N2263066.pdf>

²⁴ [Ibid.](#)

²⁵ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123702>

²⁶ <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/friedensforscherin-deitelhoff-nukleare-grossmaechte-kapitulieren-nicht-18410186.html>

an international mediation process is required to consistently negotiate and regulate controversial issues²⁷.

In June 2022, the members of the German Information Technology Society also warned of "accidental nuclear war".²⁸ They recommend avoiding measures that increase the risk of nuclear war while maintaining, improving and, if no longer available, rebuilding communication channels between political and military decision-makers. The "Deep Cuts Commission" also calls on Russia, the USA and NATO countries to take immediate concrete steps for arms control, transparency, and risk reduction with regard to the nuclear threat.²⁹

Peace opportunities according to Glasl

In times of heightened tension, direct communication between the conflict parties should never be abandoned, says peace researcher Prof. Friedrich Glasl. Indirect communication runs the risk of escalation through sources of error, distortions, misunderstandings, and insinuations. Furthermore, it is important that neutral and non-aligned states draw attention to the possible damage caused by further escalation of the Ukraine war, possibly turning into a nuclear war.

Glasl also explains that an emotionally-driven armament reflex has no deterrent value or de-escalation effect. On the contrary: "The last 150 years have shown that arms racing – contrary to its declared purpose – does not prevent wars, but paradoxically even produces and intensifies them".³⁰ In order to break out of the vicious circle of armament reflexes, initiatives for de-escalating actions are necessary. De-escalatory preliminary work could make clear a willingness to seriously reduce tensions that have arisen (GRIT method³¹).

Peace Report 2022

The four leading German peace and conflict research institutes recommend in their Peace Report 2022³² that Russia should be persuaded to find a negotiated solution: "Instead of counting on a military defeat of Russia or even propagating the overthrow of the Putin regime, Russia should be persuaded to deal with the conflict diplomatically by means of sanctions and military support for Ukraine". At the same time, the goal should be "to put forward options to enable the conflict to be resolved by diplomatic means, in a way that would make the Russian leadership more receptive to serious talks."³³

The Peace Report considers the German government's decision to supply heavy weapons "logical" but does not go as far as recommending it. The peace researchers emphasise: Nevertheless, over

²⁷ <https://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/sechs-monate-ukrainekrieg-aus-der-sicht-der-eskalationsforschung>

²⁸ <https://gi.de/meldung/offener-brief-gi-mitglieder-warnen-vor-atomkrieg-aus-versehen>

²⁹ https://deepcuts.org/images/PDF/Statement_Deep_Cuts_Commission_Ukraine.pdf

³⁰ https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/Glasl_fertig.PDF

³¹ GRIT: „Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction“ a psychological approach to resolve tension based on the concept of reciprocity.

³² <http://friedensgutachten.de/en/2022/ausgabe>

³³ http://friedensgutachten.de/user/pages/02.2022/02.ausgabe/03.stellungnahme/FGA2022_Statement.pdf

time and depending on how the conflict develops, the situation must be kept under continuous review to make sure that supplying weapons to Ukraine remains a useful course of action and does not become counterproductive. While helping Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity is essential, it is nonetheless imperative that the danger of nuclear confrontation is avoided—likewise the further proliferation of the conflict and consequently also the proliferation of the weapons supplied for this war into other conflict regions."³⁴

To reduce the danger of nuclear escalation, NATO should publicly adopt a no-first-use policy. Nuclear stockpiles should be frozen at the current level. Elsewhere it says:

"Germany should declare that it will not participate in the first use of nuclear weapons and urge the nuclear-weapon states to make corresponding "no-first-use" declarations. "³⁵ The report goes on to say: "Lasting world peace can only be achieved by means of long-term nuclear disarmament. In this context, the German government plays a particularly important role as a bridge builder—between members of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, both within the EU and within NATO."³⁶

The authors conclude that even "if in the heat of the moment it may seem illusory ", now is the right time to plan for the time after the war and to develop strategies for a new peace and security order.³⁷

The Logic of Peace

The logic of peace attempts to work backwards from the end goal of peace. The working group on peace logic of the Platform for Civil Conflict Management has developed positions on the war in Ukraine that follow the logic of peace on May 11th, 2022³⁸. The authors recommend doing everything possible to: (1.) end violence, (2.) de-escalate the conflict and transform it constructively, (3.) protect victims and reduce suffering, (4.) strengthen international law and human rights, (5.) promote reflection and empathy.

To this end, all participants should not only abandon unilateral strategies to get their own way using violence, but also make concessions to their claims to dominate or to make maximal demands. This applies, for example, to NATO's understanding of itself as a hegemonic actor, Russia's imperial ambitions in its neighbouring region and Ukraine's rapid course of integration into NATO. The fact that Kiev, in the context of the Istanbul negotiations at the end of March, was open to discuss neutrality, albeit with security guarantees, points in the right direction.

³⁴ [Ibid.](#)

³⁵ http://friedensgutachten.de/user/pages/02.2022/02.ausgabe/01.Gutachten_Gesamt/Friedensgutachten%202022%20E-Book.pdf

³⁶ http://friedensgutachten.de/user/pages/02.2022/02.ausgabe/03.stellungnahme/FGA2022_Statement.pdf

³⁷ http://friedensgutachten.de/user/pages/02.2022/02.ausgabe/01.Gutachten_Gesamt/Friedensgutachten%202022%20E-Book.pdf

³⁸ https://pzkb.de/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Stellungnahme-AG-Friedenslogik-PZKB_Friedenslogik-statt-Kriegslogik-1.pdf

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE³⁹ is the only security organisation in which Russia, North America and European countries are jointly represented. Since the beginning of the conflict, the organisation has repeatedly announced its willingness to make itself available as a platform to find a solution.

Confidence-building measures – such as the OSCE's monitoring mission of manoeuvres or military equipment – could thus be made use of again in the future. According to the Italian peace plan, a new multilateral agreement on peace and security in Europe could be negotiated within the framework of the OSCE.

However, the long-standing conflict between Russia and Western OSCE states has been hampering the organisation for some time. Former OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger stated on October 13th, 2022: "We have been observing extreme polarisation in the OSCE between key players in European security for more than a decade now: For instance, the entire arms control regime, the security architecture that the OSCE helped to build, is in the process of disintegrating. The attack on Ukraine has made this even worse. At the moment, the OSCE is largely blocked."⁴⁰

Mediation talks

Although telephone calls do not replace negotiations, they can pave the way for them. In May 2022, the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin underlined the point made by peace researchers: it is necessary to keep channels of communication open. In a telephone conversation with the Russian Foreign Minister in May 2022, he called for an "immediate ceasefire". Chancellor Scholz and French President Macron also spoke several times on the phone with Russian President Putin. They discussed an end to hostilities and treatment of prisoners of war.

Added to telephone calls, mediators can also play a major role in conflict resolution. According to Rolf Mützenich, leader of the SPD parliamentary group, the Chinese government could be considered as a mediator in the Ukraine war. In principle, states that are acceptable to both sides and have, for example, restrained themselves in condemning Russia in the UN General Assembly, such as India or South Africa, could be considered.

Diplomatic pressure for cease-fire negotiations

If a military stalemate were to occur, a window of opportunity would open up, it was said within peace research circles during the summer. According to the Peace Report 2022, "Russia should be persuaded to take a diplomatic path to end the conflict through the means of sanctions and military aid for Ukraine". Yet we are still waiting for a military stalemate or sanctions or arming Ukraine to bring about such a window of opportunity. The question arises, therefore, whether or how diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear on the conflict parties, to be prepared to negotiate and compromise, even when both parties might find this painful from their perspective.

In principle, it is conceivable that China or India could exert influence on the Russian government, while the EU and the USA are the obvious partners to talk to Ukraine. In this context, the idea of ending or limiting arms deliveries has also been discussed, e.g., by Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick and

³⁹ <https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine>

⁴⁰ <https://www.diepresse.com/6202036/ex-osze-chef-zu-ukraine-konflikt-haette-nicht-im-krieg-enden-muessen>

former Inspector General Harald Kujat⁴¹. Kujat called for the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine to be looked at from its endpoint: "I find it astonishing that the Western governments are accepting all of this without trying to interrupt this upward spin of escalation and prevent this situation from turning into a catastrophe, as described by the US President," said the former Inspector General. According to Johannes Varwick, however, should a compromise be reached, the West might have to accept a status quo that it does not like.

Given the danger of escalation, Jeffrey Sachs recommends that Europe should pressure both warring parties to sit down at the negotiating table and call on the US and the UK to support a compromise instead of continued war⁴². Klaus von Dohnanyi expressed similar views in the September/October 2022 issue of Emma: "I can only see a negotiated solution if the US is understood by the Europeans to be the most important party in this war." As principal arms supplier to Ukraine, the US should encourage the Ukrainians to agree to a ceasefire, says Jack F. Matlock, former US ambassador to Moscow⁴³. Research on terminating war, based on statistical-empirical studies, shows that arms deliveries only play a positive role in ending a war "when this form of support is discontinued."⁴⁴

Former OSCE and UN diplomat Michael von der Schulenburg also calls for winning the peace, not the war in Ukraine: "What makes the war in Ukraine so extraordinarily dangerous is the fact that even after seven months of war, all warring parties are focused solely on winning this war while making no effort to achieve peace. Despite the threat of nuclear war, there are no diplomatic channels between the West and Russia to prevent misunderstandings, avoid further escalation and create the conditions for a diplomatic solution."⁴⁵

III Civilian popular movements

Growing support for peace solution among Europeans

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) published a study on 15 June 2022 that analysed the attitudes of people in ten European countries towards a possible outcome of the war.⁴⁶ The study shows that while Europeans feel great solidarity with Ukraine and support sanctions against Russia, they are divided on long-term goals.

According to the survey, 35 percent of the respondents belonged to the "peace camp" that wants to see the war end as soon as possible, even if that would mean concessions from Ukraine. The "justice camp" with 22 percent support, on the other hand, thought that Russia should be punished. Another fifth (20 %) refused to choose between peace and justice, but still largely support the EU's measures

⁴¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quCj5vXLcQ0>

⁴² <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/wirtschaft-verantwortung/nord-stream-pipelnes-wohl-deswegen-zerstoert-jeffrey-sachs-hat-neue-theorien-zu-den-lecks-li.273634>

⁴³ <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/17/on-ukraine-the-us-is-on-the-hook-to-find-a-way-out/>

⁴⁴ <https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/artikel/die-ukraine-wird-gewinnen/>

⁴⁵ <https://michael-von-der-schulenburg.com/in-der-ukraine-muss-es-darum-gehenden-frieden-und-nicht-den-krieg-zu-gewinnen/>

⁴⁶ <https://ecfr.eu/publication/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-ukraine/>

in response to Russia's war in Ukraine. The members of this "swing group" shared the anti-Russian sentiments of the justice camp, but also feared escalation - like the "peace camp."

Apart from Poland, the "peace camp" is larger than the "justice camp" in all countries. European citizens are concerned about the costs of economic sanctions and the danger of nuclear escalation. There is broad public support for increasing military spending only in Poland, Germany, Sweden, and Finland.

In Germany, according to a survey by the RTL/ntv "trend barometer", approval has been declining since May 2022 for arms deliveries to Ukraine⁴⁷. This trend is ongoing: according to a poll conducted by the market and opinion research institute Forsa on behalf of RTL Germany on 26-29 August 2022⁴⁸, a large majority of 77 per cent of the German population believes that the West should, in the present phase, make concrete efforts to initiate negotiations to end the Ukraine war. According to the current ARD "Deutschlandtrend" of November 3rd, 2022, 55 percent of respondents said that the German government's diplomatic efforts do not go far enough⁴⁹.

Another survey by the Körber Foundation concludes that most German citizens (52 percent) would like to see more international restraint on the part of Germany. On the other hand, 41 percent of those surveyed were in favour of Germany becoming more involved - but such involvement should preferably be diplomatic (65 percent) rather than military (14 percent) or financial (13 percent). This means that the attitude of Germans has hardly changed compared to the previous year (2021: 50 per cent in favour of restraint) - despite Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the "turning point in time" for German foreign and security policy, proclaimed by Chancellor Scholz.⁵⁰

Protests in Germany, Italy, and Spain

On February 27th, 2022, hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Berlin demonstrating under the slogan "Stop the war! Peace for Ukraine and all of Europe"⁵¹. On March 13th, demonstrations took place again, this time in several cities, including Berlin, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Leipzig. According to the organisers - an alliance of peace, human rights, and environmental organisations as well as trade unions and churches - there were 125,000 demonstrators nationwide⁵².

On July 2nd, 2022, thousands of people demonstrated in Berlin against the 100-billion-euro rearmament package for the Bundeswehr. A broad civil society alliance called for people to join the

⁴⁷ <https://www.rnd.de/politik/umfrage-zu-krieg-in-ukraine-das-denken-die-deutschen-ueber-waffenlieferungen-und-deutschlands-ZGCE4DYHONWSLRH2YA76T3TQU.html>

⁴⁸ <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/77-der-Deutschen-wollen-dass-der-Westen-Verhandlungen-zum-Kriegsende-anstoest-article23556418.html>

⁴⁹ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/dtrend-nov-2022-101.pdf>

⁵⁰ <https://koerber-stiftung.de/projekte/the-berlin-pulse/2022-23/>

⁵¹ <https://www.rbb24.de/politik/thema/Ukraine/beitraege/grossdemonstration-strasse-des-17--juni-berlin-russland-invasion-putin.html>

⁵² <https://www.rnd.de/politik/putins-krieg-mega-demos-in-deutschland-fuer-frieden-mit-putin-pappmache-figur-DLH4B7RVV3FYET2BWIQD5UEMWE.html>

demonstration under the motto "We will not pay for your wars! 100 billion for democratic, civil, and social turning-point instead of arms build-up".⁵³

On October 1st, 2022, thousands of people followed the call of the coalition "Kooperation für den Frieden" and the "Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag" for a nationwide day of action. Despite rain, around 30 protest events took place across Germany against war - especially the war in Ukraine - and for any new national debts to be dedicated to social, just, and ecological peace policies⁵⁴. On the Day of German Unity, October 3rd, 2022, more than 100,000 people protested, mainly in East Germany, against the energy crisis resulting from the war in Ukraine⁵⁵. Nationalist and right-wing extremist parties and currents used these justified popular concerns to create a mood against the government and to promote their own agenda.

On June 29th, 2022, supporters of the "Ceasefire Now" appeal - including retired General Erich Vad, Jeffrey Sachs, and Prof. Dr. Johannes Varwick - called on the Western community of states to end the Ukraine war through negotiation⁵⁶.

In Italy, domestic tensions and public protests are on the rise. Dock workers in Italy refused to ship weapons, ammunition, and explosives to Ukraine. The "Five Star" party wanted to pass a resolution demanding that no more weapons be delivered from Italy to Ukraine. The resolution said that Russia was waging a war of attrition that could not be won militarily. A diplomatic solution must be found, it said. Italy's Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio resigned from the Five Star Movement as a result of the dispute.⁵⁷ In mid-October 2022, there were decentralised actions in over 100 Italian cities for an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine. On November 5th, 2022, 100,000 people in Rome called for an immediate ceasefire and the start of international peace negotiations for Ukraine. The call by the "Europe for Peace" platform was supported by 600 organisations, calling for a ban on all nuclear weapons, a ceasefire now and negotiations for peace, as well as for the UN to convene an international peace conference⁵⁸.

In Spain, too, there were protests in the run-up to the NATO summit against Spanish military spending, which is to be increased because of the Russian war against Ukraine.⁵⁹

Deserters in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia

According to the Ukrainian secret service, numerous Russian soldiers have refused to serve. Opponents of war in both Russia and Ukraine also report that many professional soldiers and conscripts in Russia have refused to fight⁶⁰. In March 2022, a civil society alliance appealed to the

⁵³ <https://zivilezeitenwende.de/>

⁵⁴ <https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1167386.heisser-herbst-diplomatisches-ringen.html>

⁵⁵ <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2022-10/tag-der-deutschen-einheit-demonstrationen-ostdeutschland>

⁵⁶ <https://www.zeit.de/2022/27/ukraine-krieg-frieden-waffenstillstand>

⁵⁷ <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/welt-nationen/italien-fuenf-sterne-bewegung-zerfaellt-li.239182>

⁵⁸ <https://sbilanciamoci.info/nazionale-friedens-demonstration-in-rom-am-5-november/>

⁵⁹ <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/tausende-auf-der-strasse-NATO-gegner-demonstrieren-vor-gipfel-in-madrid-li.240569>

⁶⁰ <https://www.merkur.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-news-russland-armee-putin-offizier-verweigerung-bericht-cnn-truppen-kampf-91566673.html>

German Bundestag to grant protection and asylum to Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian conscientious objectors and deserters.⁶¹ In Belarus and Ukraine there is no right to conscientious objection. In Russia, the right exists, albeit in a very limited way.⁶² "Connection e.V." campaigns for a comprehensive right to conscientious objection. At the beginning of June, the association reckoned that many men were seeking safety abroad, who were among the 300,000 people who have left Russia because of the war. There were also conscientious objectors in Ukraine. In May and June 2022, two conscientious objectors were given suspended prison sentences of several years in Ukraine.⁶³ About 3,000 men from Ukraine have applied for asylum in Moldova alone. In addition, about 20,000 men from Belarus have left the country in recent months to escape recruitment.⁶⁴ So far, Russian men who are evading military service do not have good prospects of gaining the right to stay in Germany. Connection e.V. is committed to changing this: desertion should be classed as an act of political opposition, and people should therefore be given the necessary protection.

Civil society protest in Russia

Civil society resistance in Russia is being heavily repressed. On the day the Ukraine war began, more than 1,700 demonstrators were arrested by police in 53 cities across Russia. On March 2nd, people protested in more than 25 Russian cities. On March 4th, the Russian government passed a censorship law punishing protest the war with sentences of up to 15 years in prison. On the weekend of March 19th and 20th, people again demonstrated against the war in numerous cities in Russia. Thousands of people again took to the streets in Russia in September against the partial mobilisation for the Ukraine war. More than 1,300 people were arrested during the demonstrations. In Moscow, people chanted "No war!" or demanded a "Russia without Putin"⁶⁵. According to the OVD-Info, an independent human rights media project, there have been nearly 20,000 arrests at anti-war and mobilisation protest events since February 24th, 2022⁶⁶.

The anti-war appeal by the Russian civil rights activist Lev Ponomaryov was signed by over one million people as of February 28th, 2022. Lev Ponomaryov was arrested without charge on February 28th. Russian scientists* protested Russia's invasion of Ukraine in an open letter on February 24th, 2022⁶⁷. The open letter was signed by more than 7,750 people as of March 7th, 2022, including many members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, citing their names and scientific institutions.

The Russian and Ukrainian IPPNW affiliates published a joint declaration on March 17th, 2022, in which they spoke out against the war in Ukraine and warned against further escalation to nuclear war.⁶⁸ The declaration united physicians across the borders of war and built on the principle of a

⁶¹ <https://www.ippnw.de/frieden/konflikte-kriege/ukraine/artikel/de/breites-buendnis-fordert-schutz-und-a.html>

⁶² <https://www.proasyl.de/hintergrund/kriegsdienstverweigerung-und-desertion-belarus-russische-foederation-und-ukraine/>

⁶³ <https://de.connection-ev.org/article-3594>

⁶⁴ <https://de.connection-ev.org/article-3576>

⁶⁵ <https://www.fr.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-tausende-protestieren-russland-putin-teilmobilmachung-festnahmen-91804159.html>

⁶⁶ <https://ovdinfo.org/>

⁶⁷ <https://t-invariant.org/2022/02/we-are-against-war/>

⁶⁸ <https://www.ippnw.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Joint-Russia-Ukraine-Statement-16-March-2022.docx.pdf>

medical duty to help people equally and without prejudice. Both affiliates also emphasised the deep ties between Russia and Ukraine: familial, cultural, and economic. In addition, by the beginning of March 2022, more than 17,000 Russian doctors and health professionals had called for an end to hostilities.^{69 70}

A group of municipal deputies from St. Petersburg decided to file an appeal on September 7th, 2022. The seven politicians demanded that Putin be charged with treason and removed from office⁷¹. A petition for the resignation of President Putin has so far been signed by more than 40 local politicians from a total of 18 districts of St. Petersburg and the capital Moscow⁷².

Civil Resistance

Societal defence is a non-militarist concept of defence. According to Ulrich Stadtmann of the Federation for Social Defence, it is based on the concepts of civil resistance, dynamic non-collaborative work continuance and international non-military support⁷³. There are repeated reports of civil resistance in the Ukrainian war, for example in Cherson. A year after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the separatist areas, the International Sociological Institute in Kiev conducted a representative survey among Ukrainians on the question of how they would act if their city were attacked and occupied. One third did not know the answer, 15 % wanted to flee, 25 % wanted to resist militarily and more than 25 % were in favour of civil resistance⁷⁴. International law expert Prof. Dr Norman Paech also points to the concept of undefended cities. According to Article 25 of the Hague Regulation on Land Warfare of 1907⁷⁵, it is prohibited to attack or shell undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. In the Second World War, this path had been chosen by numerous cities for fear of the brutal warfare of the Nazis: Rotterdam 1940, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade 1941, Rome 1943, Orvieto, Florence, Athens 1944⁷⁶.

⁶⁹ <https://madmed.media/open-letter/>

⁷⁰ Shortly afterwards, both chambers of the Russian parliament voted in favour of a law under which Russians could face up to 15 years in prison for spreading "critical information about the war in Ukraine".

⁷¹ <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/joferew-putin-kommunalpolitik-kritik-101.html>

⁷² https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/ukraine/id_100051936/russland-kritik-an-wladimir-putin-alles-ist-schiefgelaufen-.html

⁷³ <https://wissenschaft-und-frieden.de/artikel/nicht-ankennen-nicht-kooperieren/>

⁷⁴ https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/blog_post/ukrainians-vs-putin-potential-for-nonviolent-civilian-based-defense/

⁷⁵ https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rule37_sectionc

⁷⁶ <https://www.heise.de/tp/features/So-koennen-wir-die-Staedte-der-Ukraine-vor-dem-Krieg-bewahren-6544805.html>

IV IPPNW's demands

Hamburg Declaration

In the Hamburg Declaration⁷⁷ adopted on 30 April 2022, the Nobel Peace Prize winner IPPNW calls for a permanent ceasefire. It demands that Russia and the USA jointly declare a renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons. The German section of the IPPNW also advocates long-term negotiations on a peace process that takes into account the security needs of all participating states, including Russia, on the basis of a common security concept.

In order to advance negotiations and diplomacy, IPPNW proposes the use of mediators, e.g. the UN Secretary General, non-aligned states or the Pope. Pope Francis has repeatedly declared his willingness to campaign for peace in Ukraine in Moscow.

Prevention of nuclear war

Nuclear deterrence is not a means of preventing war but encapsulates the danger of a global catastrophe. IPPNW therefore demands as a first step that Russia and the USA renounce the use of nuclear weapons. More than one million people have already supported this demand with a petition.⁷⁸ Both countries must remove the approximately 2,000 nuclear weapons from their heightened state of alert. This measure would reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. Both Russia and NATO are currently building-up their nuclear weapons capacity: According to President Vladimir Putin, Russia plans to deliver nuclear-capable missiles to Belarus "in the coming months".⁷⁹ At the same time, the US nuclear weapons deployed at the Büchel air force base in Germany are being modernised and replaced by B61-12 bombs. These can be guided and have a variable yield when used. This lowers the inhibition threshold for deployment - an enormous danger that Germany should not support.

Instead, Germany should refuse to allow the deployment of modernised US nuclear weapons completely. A further step could be a general renunciation of the stationing of US nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO countries. In view of the Ukraine war, and the increased danger of nuclear war, countries such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey could declare that they will renounce nuclear sharing and join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). In return, negotiations could be held with Russia to dismantle the nuclear weapons depots in Kaliningrad and to renounce the stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus.⁸⁰

IPPNW also calls for a ban on military attacks on nuclear power plants. In principle, nuclear power plants fall under the special protection of the Geneva Convention (Art. 56, para. 1, S1 of the 1st Additional Protocol) for "dangerous installations", such as dams, from whose destruction the civilian population must be protected. Since nuclear facilities are always "dual-use objects", serving both civilian and military purposes, the parties to the Geneva Convention in the 1970s were unable to

⁷⁷ https://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Resolution_Im_Sturm_den_Friedenskurs_halten.pdf

⁷⁸ Avaaz Petition "No Nuclear War over Ukraine", https://secure.avaaz.org/community_petitions/en/nato_and_the_russian_federation_no_nuclear_war_over_ukraine/

⁷⁹ <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/belarus-iskander-atomwaffen--russland-NATO-100.html>

⁸⁰ <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/06/kaliningrad>

agree on a fundamental exclusion of nuclear power plants from acts of war. Therefore, there are no clear rules in international law on distance and safety zones around nuclear power plants. Due to the war in Ukraine, IPPNW urges the international community to fill this gap in international law. It is urgently necessary that Russian troops withdraw from inside nuclear facilities and the surrounding area, and that these areas become fully demilitarised zones by both warring parties to protect the civilian population. Following weeks of international efforts, IAEA inspectors were finally able to inspect the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in early September 2022.

In its report of September 6th, 2022, the International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA called for an immediate end to the shelling and the establishment of a "safe zone" around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant⁸¹. The head of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, described the situation on site as "untenable", stating that it posed "a constant threat to nuclear safety and security with potential impact on critical safety functions that may lead to radiological consequences with great safety significance"⁸². The inspectors found significant damage: there was a hole in the roof of a building where new fuel rods and radioactive waste are stored. They also expressed concern about the working conditions of Ukrainian staff, who were being subjected to harassment by the Russian army. The demand for the creation of a demilitarised zone around the nuclear power plant has so far failed due to the resistance of both warring parties.

The logic of peace instead of war

IPPNW strongly criticises the 100-billion-euro rearmament programme for the Bundeswehr. This planned rearmament will not contribute to ending the war in the Ukraine in any way. On the contrary, deploying new B61-12 nuclear weapons in Europe and the purchasing of F35 fighter jets represent a nuclear build-up and could escalate the conflict.

In addition to this arms build-up, IPPNW sees arms deliveries to Ukraine in a critical light, although they do not question the will of parts of the Ukrainian population to defend themselves with weapons. IPPNW points out that every further delivery of weapons means an aggravation of the situation and a prolongation of the war. At the same time, weapons reinforce the proxy war character of the conflict. Weapons deliveries increase the number of human victims and the destruction of infrastructure. They are not only used for defence but are passed on and make civilian measures of defence more difficult. By supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine, Germany runs the danger of being drawn into the maelstrom of war. If the war escalates further, there is a risk of the possible use of nuclear weapons.⁸³

Enemy image reduction

The creation of enemy stereotypes is a common mechanism of war propaganda. The aim is to dehumanise others and negate them as personalities. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin has already been equated with Hitler. "We find this oppressive logic in all political persecutions, in

⁸¹ <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/un-security-council-iaea-grossi-calls-for-establishment-of-nuclear-safety-and-security-protection-zone-at-zaporizhzhya-npp>

⁸² <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-calls-for-nuclear-safety-exclusion-zone-around>

⁸³ In the leaflet "Risks and side effects of arms deliveries", the IPPNW provides information on the long-term consequences of arms deliveries (in German):
https://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Frieden/Infoblatt_Waffenlieferungen.pdf

the exclusion of ethnic or religious groups, but also in international blaming (such as the Russians or the Axis of Evil)."⁸⁴

The IPPNW calls for opposition to the creation of enemy stereotypes. It is important to maintain civil society and cultural exchange with Russia. City partnerships with Russia should be kept. The IPPNW rejects cultural, sporting, and scientific sanctions. IPPNW also calls for the reactions that increase escalation and humiliating rhetoric to be rejected.

Conclusion

"Achieving peace requires we think beyond the war logic and develop diplomatic options to at least freeze violent conflicts with a view to resolving them in the medium or longer term," is written in the conclusions of the Peace Report 2022⁸⁵.

Following the Russian attack on Ukraine, we first experienced a reflex to arm all directly and indirectly involved states particularly in Europe, following a pattern of thinking and acting according to the logic of war. The "myth of redemptive violence" is a reaction to the population's feelings of fear and insecurity. Mutual enemy stereotyping and the dehumanisation of the enemy are increasingly prevalent in civil society. In the meantime, we have been in a spiral of escalation for a long time, the end of which is not in sight. With each passing day, the irreconcilability increases, the dividing lines harden more and more. So far, neither waiting for a military stalemate nor arms deliveries nor sanctions have been able to open a window of opportunity for ceasefire talks. The international community is called upon, and especially the nations allied with the parties to the conflict, have a duty to exert influence and pressure on the warring parties for a ceasefire.

As doctors, we at IPPNW advocate an end to violence and a limit to harm. Following the logic of peace, we need to prepare ourselves during the war in Ukraine for when the time is ripe for a ceasefire as well as for the period after the war has ended. In this sense, we call for intensified international diplomatic efforts in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution of October 2022. In view of the current threatening situation, negotiation to end the war is the only expedient and effective measure, like the grain agreement brokered by the UN and Turkey, the prisoner exchange or the mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Ukraine.

This is the third version of our paper "Ceasefire and Peace for Ukraine", following the first version of July 27th and the first update of August 31st, 2022. In the course of time, further proposals have emerged, and the escalating dynamics of the war continue to bring new points of view into focus.

This paper can be ordered from the IPPNW Berlin office:

IPPNW - German Section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Physicians in Social Responsibility e.V. - Körtestraße 10 - 10967 Berlin

Phone: +49 (0)30 698 074-0 - Fax: +49 (0)30 683 8166 - ippnw@ippnw.de - www.ippnw.de

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⁸⁴ „Feindbilder und Kriegslogik – ein Beitrag zur psychosozialen Dimension“, [IPPNW-Forum 2/2022](#)

⁸⁵ http://friedensgutachten.de/user/pages/02.2022/02.ausgabe/01.Gutachten_Gesamt/Friedensgutachten%202022%20E-Book.pdf